Showing posts with label Programming. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Programming. Show all posts

Computer Magazines - IE8 Tops Browser Market Share

Computer Magazines - IE8 Tops Browser Market Share

Probably not a whole lot to be surprised about here, but Microsoft is patting itself of the back because, in spite of increased competition from alternative browsers like Chrome, Firefox, and Safari, the latest version of Internet Explorer now how the highest marketshare on a worldwide basis, according to Net MarketShare's January report.

The browser grabbed 27.9 percent usage, itself only a fraction of the total IE market share, which is closer to 62 percent, in spite of an aggressive push on the part of Web designers to wean users off of old versions of the browser.

The Internet Explorer team echoed the call to update from Internet Explorer 6 in a blog post today.

Posted By:  Brian Heater

Computer Magazines - Microsoft probes Windows 7 laptop battery problems

Laptop users claim the new Windows 7 OS has permanently crippled their batteries

Microsoft said Tuesday it is looking into battery problems apparently affecting Windows 7 notebooks.

Users have complained of battery issues -- including premature warnings that the power is exhausted, as well as more dire demands to replace the battery -- for months, long before Windows 7 went final.

[ Get InfoWorld's 21-page hands-on look at the new version of Windows. | The real-world state of Windows: Check out InfoWorld's live Windows Pulse monitors of users' app preferences and PC configurations. | Looking for the ultimate laptop? It doesn't exist yet, so InfoWorld designed the perfect notebook. See how close your laptop comes to our dream machine. ]

Microsoft claimed that the problem was in the Windows 7 tool that decided when the battery had been drained, or was unable to hold a charge. "We are investigating this issue in conjunction with our hardware partners, which appears to be related to system firmware (BIOS)," a Microsoft spokeswoman said today, referring to the firmware that boots the PC and initializes the hardware components. "The warning received in Windows 7 uses firmware information to determine if battery replacement is needed."
A very long thread on Microsoft's support site dedicated to Windows 7 battery problems kicked off in early June 2009, and remains active; more than a dozen new messages were posted on Tuesday, for example.

While some users on that thread agree with Microsoft that the warnings are spurious, others believe that the new operating system has permanently crippled their batteries.

"I have tried charging the battery while the computer is off or in another OS, and it does not work," said someone identified as "DanLee81" today. "It will charge for a few minutes, then stop. The battery will say it's full when it actually only has a few minutes of charge, and when you take out the A/C, it will either last for a few minutes, or completely shut off your laptop. This behavior happens in all [OSes] after Windows 7 damages the battery, not just within Windows 7."

Others reported that their batteries underperformed, even after they abandoned Windows 7 and returned their notebooks to running Windows XP or Vista, or switched to Linux . "Rolling back does not work either," said "Dreklia" in another message on Tuesday. "I feel rip[ped] off!"


Computer Magazines - Eight PHP power tools

Eclipse PDT, NetBeans, NuSphere PhpED, and Zend Studio lead a capable field of IDEs for Web developers

Though precise statistics are difficult to obtain, PHP is undeniably a top choice as a Website building language. Since October 2009, the TIOBE Programming Community Index has PHP holding third place -- behind Java and C -- among programming languages overall. Regardless of the exact extent of PHP's usage, you need only consider that Web sites such as Facebook -- which manages millions of users and petabytes of content -- use PHP; workloads of that magnitude demand a serious programming language and supporting environment.

You can't build a world-class Website without a good development environment. In the case of PHP, the development environment must be particularly capable; a PHP programmer will rarely be programming only in PHP. PHP is necessarily entwined with HTML and JavaScript on the front end and with SQL on the back end. Consequently, a good PHP IDE must allow the developer to work with equal ease in multiple languages (both programming and markup) and contexts.

In this article, we examine eight IDEs: ActiveState's Komodo IDE, CodeLobster PHP Edition, Eclipse PHP Development Tools (PDT), MPSoftware's phpDesigner, NetBeans IDE for PHP, NuSphere's PhpED, WaterProof's PHPEdit, and Zend Studio. All of these PHP toolkits offer strong support for the other languages and environments (HTML, CSS, JavaScript, SQL database) that a PHP developer encounters. The key differences we discovered were in the tools they provide (HTML inspector, SQL management system) for various tasks, the quality of their documentation, and general ease-of-use.

In our estimation, four of these IDEs rise to the top. Zend Studio is an excellent PHP IDE once you become familiar with the Eclipse landscape. NuSphere's PhpED is also first rate and deserves your consideration if you need a professional-quality IDE and support. If you're on a budget or you can make it without technical support, Eclipse PDT and NetBeans are exceptional tools.

As always, development tool choice is heavily influenced by personal idiosyncrasies. For example, we know good developers who love Eclipse, and we know good developers who despise it. All the IDEs in this roundup are either free or available for a reasonable trial period. Use our commentary as a guide, but you owe it to yourself to spend some time with each IDE that appears to have the proper mixture of features needed on your PHP project.

Innovative Technique Can Spot Errors in Key Technological Systems; Early Alerts for Satellites, Weather Instruments

An innovative computational technique that draws on statistics, imaging and other disciplines has the capability to detect errors in sensitive technological systems ranging from satellites to weather instruments.

The patented technique, known as the Intelligent Outlier Detection Algorithm, or IODA, is described this month in the Journal of Atmospheric and Oceanic Technology.

IODA offers the potential to alert operators to faulty readings or other problems associated with failing sensors. If sensors malfunction and begin transmitting bad data, computers programmed with the algorithm could identify the problem and isolate that bad data.

IODA was developed by researchers at the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) and the University of Colorado at Boulder (CU).

The National Science Foundation (NSF), NCAR's sponsor, funded the research. "This technology will have broad applicability in many new areas," says Steve Nelson, NSF program director for NCAR.

The developers of the algorithm say its principles can eventually be used in a vast range of technological settings, including cars and other transportation systems, power plants, satellites and space exploration, and data from radars and other observing instruments.

"This could, at least in theory, enable operators to keep a system performing even while it's failing," says Andrew Weekley, a software engineer at NCAR who led the algorithm development effort. "When a system starts to fail, it's absolutely critical to be able to control it as long as possible. That can make the difference between disaster or not."

IODA is designed to perform quality control on time series data--that is, data collected over time, such as wind speeds over the course of a month.

The algorithm, an expert system that draws on statistics, graph theory, image processing and decision trees, can be applied in cases where the correct assessment of data is critical, the incoming data are too numerous for a human to easily review, or the consequences of a sensor failure would be significant.

At present the algorithm consists of several thousand lines of a technical computing language known as MATLAB. The researchers may expand and translate it into a computer programming language such as C so it can be used for commercial purposes.

Ensuring the quality of incoming time series data is a priority for virtually any organization involved in complex operations. If sensors begin relaying inaccurate information, it can be highly challenging for personnel or automated systems to separate good data from bad, especially in cases involving enormous amounts of information.

Typically, to identify bad data, complex operations may rely on multiple sensors, as well as algorithms that characterize specific relationships among the data being collected, and identify failures when the data unexpectedly change.

A drawback in most of these algorithms, however, is they are designed for a particular type of time series and can fail catastrophically when applied to different types of data, especially in situations where there are numerous and sometimes subtle errors.

IODA, however, compares incoming data to common patterns of failure--an approach that can be applied broadly because it is independent of a specific sensor or measurement.

Weekley and co-authors took a new approach to the problem when they began developing IODA 10 years ago. Whereas existing methods treat the data as a function of time, Weekley conceived of an algorithm that treats the data as an image.

This approach mimics the way a person might look at a plot of data points to spot an inconsistency.

For example, if a person looked at a line drawn between points on a graph that represented morning temperatures rising from 50 to 70 degrees, and then spotted a place where that smooth line was broken, dipping precipitously because of numerous data points down at 10 degrees, the person would immediately suspect there was a bad sensor reading.

In cases where there are thousands or even millions of data points about temperature or other variables, pinpointing the bad ones can be more difficult.

But Weekley thought that a computer could be programmed to recognize common patterns of failure through image processing techniques.

Then, like a person eyeing data, the computer could identify problems with data points such as jumps and intermittency; view patterns in the data; and determine not only whether a particular datum is bad but also characterize how it is inaccurate.

"Our thought was to organize a sequence of data as an image and apply image processing techniques to identify a failure unambiguously," Weekley says. "We thought that, by using image processing, we could teach the system to detect inconsistencies, somewhat like a person would."

The research team came up with ways of arranging data points in a time series into clusters, both in a domain that represents the data points over time and in another domain known as delay space.

Delay space, which offers another way to detect differences in the data, is a technique that pairs a data point in the time series with the previous value.

Using the clusters from both the time domain and delay space, bad data are separated into their own cluster, clearly distinct from the cluster of accurate data. At the same time, IODA can calculate quality scores indicating if each individual data point is good or bad.

"I would say the approach we report in the paper is a radical departure from the usual techniques found in the time series literature," says Kent Goodrich, a CU mathematician and a co-author of the paper.

"The image processing and other techniques are not new, but the use of these images and techniques together in a time series application is new. IODA is able to characterize good and bad points very well in some commonly encountered situations."

When the research team tested IODA, they found it accurately isolated incorrect data in several cases.

For example, they applied the algorithm to wind readings from anemometers in Alaska that contained faulty errors due to a loose nut, which left the anemometers unable to consistently measure gusts in high-wind situations. The algorithm identified the bad readings, separating them into a series of clusters away from the good data.

"This technique has very broad implications," Weekley says. "Virtually all control systems rely on time series data at some level, and the ability to identify suspect data along with the possible failure is very useful in creating systems that are more robust.

"We think it is a powerful methodology that could be applied to almost all sequences of measurements that vary over time."

Windows XP Tricks

Windows NT/2000/2003 Server Microsoft Office support Internet Explorer Forum Alternative Computing Linux Support Mac Support Other Operating systems Mozilla/Firefox Browsers Other Browsers Hardware Support Motherboards, Bios & CPU Hard Drive Support Remove.


Microsoft executive our research!

Ah, there is no feeling like sight your study in the programme when drinking your morning coffee... In this example whatever Steve Riley, a grownup security strategist at Microsoft, decided to \"rebute\" our recent Black Hat presentations investigate results.

Mr. poet had been quoted by ZDnet as saying:

\"Her [Joanna Rutkowska] insistence is that you can replace the hypervisor without anybody knowing... Our assertion is that this is incorrect,\" poet told the audience. \"First of all, to do these attacks you need to embellish chief at the root. So that's feat to be, on an befittingly configured machine, an extremely arduous abstract to happen.\"

Apparently, Mr. poet has never seen our Black Hat presentations (or slides at least) that he is referring to (oh, wait, that is the typical case with every our \"refuters\", how come?)...

First, we never said anything most exchange the hypervisor. I really hit no idea how this idea was born in Mr. Riley's head? Replacing the hypervisor - that would indeed be unstable for us to do!

Second, it is not genuine that the assailant needs to embellish an chief \"at the root\" (he stingy the root construction or administrative domain here I assume). The attack we presented in our second speech, that misused a heap stream in the Xen hypervisor FLASK module, could hit been conducted from the unprivileged domain, as we demonstrated during the presentation.

Mr. poet continues with his vision:

\"Because you [the attacker] didn't subject your own replacement hypervisor through the complete organisation review that ours did, I'll bet your hypervisor is probably not feat to implement 100 percent of the functionality as the example one,\" poet said. \"There will be a notch or digit and we will be healthy to detect that.\"

Well, if he exclusive took the try of hunting into our slides, he would realize that, in case of XenBluePill, we were slipping it beneath (not replacing!) the example hypervisor, and then run the example digit as nested. So, every the functionality of the example hypervisor was preserved.

Mr. poet also shares whatever another connector breaking thoughts in this article, but I think we can yield them uncommented ;)

This situation is pretty funny actually - we hit here the words and feelings of whatever Microsoft executive vs. our three technical presentations, every the code that we released for those presentations, and also a some of our demos. Yet, it's apparently still worth effort into the programme and reporting what the feeling of Mr. poet are...
Let me, however, write digit more time, that I'm (still) not a Microsoft hater. There are many grouping at Microsoft that I respect: Brandon Baker, Neil Clift, the LSD guys, Mark Russinovich, and probably a some more that I just haven't had occasion to foregather in person or maybe forgot most at the moment. It's thus modify more sad that grouping like Mr. poet are also associated with Microsoft, modify more they are the grappling of Microsoft for the eld of people. Throwing a party in Vegas and Amsterdam erst a assemblage sure is not enough to change the Microsoft's ikon in this case...

Interestingly, if Mr. poet exclusive attended our Xen 0wning Trilogy at Black Hat, then he would notice that we were actually rattling positive most Hyper-V. Of course, I pointed out that Xen 3.3 sure has a more bonded structure right now, but I also said that I knew (from talking to whatever MS engineers from the virtualization group) that Hyper-V is feat to implement kindred features in the incoming version(s) and that this is rattling good. I also prized the fact it has exclusive most 100k LOC (vs. most 300k LOC in Xen 3.3).

So, Mr. Senior Security Strategist, I suggest you do your homework more carefully incoming instance before throwing dirt at others and trying to differ the value of their impact (and every the efforts of Microsoft's PR people).

On a separate note, I found it quite unprofessional that ZDNet's Liam Tung and Tom Espiner, the authors of the news, didn't ask me for a commentary before publishing this. Not to study that they also misspelled Rafal's study and forgot to study most Alex, the third co-author of the presentations.
 

Why do I miss Microsoft BitLocker?

In the previous post, I wrote the only one thing I rattling miss after I've switched from Vista to Mac is the BitLocker Driver Encryption. I thought it strength be engrossing for others to understand my position, so beneath I describe why I conceive BitLocker is so cool, and why I conceive another grouping round encryption software sucks.


So, it's every about the Trusted Boot. BitLocker does attain ingest of a trusty rush process, patch every the another grouping encryption software I'm alive of, does not. But why the trusty rush feature is so useful? Let's start with a hurried digression about what the trusty rush impact is…


Trusted rush crapper be implemented using either a Static Root of Trust or a Dynamic Root of Trust.


The Static Root of Trust approach (also known as Static Root of Trust Measurement or SRTM) is pretty direct — the grouping starts booting from some immutable example of code code that we assume is always trusty (hence the static root) and that initiates the measurement process, in which each factor measures the incoming digit in a chain. So, e.g. this immutable example of code will prototypal calculate the hash of the BIOS andextend a TPM's PCR run with the continuance of this hash. Then the BIOS does the aforementioned with the PCI EEPROMs and the MBR, before handling execution to them. Then the bootloader measures the OS loader before executing it. And so on.


An alternative method to implementing trusty rush is to ingest Dynamic Root of Trust (often called Dynamic Root of Trust Measurement or DRTM). Intel'sTXT technology , formerly LaGrande, is an example of a DRTM (more precisely: TXT is more than meet DRTM, but DRTM is the bicentric concept on which TXT is built). We will betalking a aggregation about TXT incoming month at Black Hat in DC :) This will include discussion of why DRTM strength sometimes be preferred over SRTM and, of course, what are the challenges with both.


Essentially, both SRTM and DRTM, in the environment of a trusty boot, are supposed to provide the same: assurance the grouping that meet booted is actually the grouping that we wanted to rush (i.e. the trusty one) and not some restricted grouping (e.g. compromised by an MBR virus).


BitLocker uses the Static Root of Trust Measurement. SRTM crapper rattling attain sense when we combine it with either TPM sealing or attestation feature. BitLocker uses the former to attain trusty that exclusive the trusty grouping crapper get access to the round coding key. In another words: BitLocker relies on the TPM that it will unseal (release) the coding key (needed to decrypt the grouping partition) when and exclusive when the state of chosen PCR registers is the aforementioned is it was when the coding key was sealed into the TPM.


Ok, why is this trusty rush impact so essential for the grouping round encryption software? Because it protects against a ultimate two-stage attack:
  1. You leave your laptop (can be even fully powered down) in a hotel room and go down for a breakfast… Meanwhile an Evil Maid enters your room. She holds an Evil USB stick in her hand and plugs it into your laptop and presses the power button. The system starts and boots from the USB. An Evil version of something similar to our BluePillBoot gets installed into the MBR (or to a PCI EEPROM). This Evil Program has only one task — to sniff out the encryption software's password/PIN and then report it back to the maid next time she comes...
  2. So, you come back to your room to brush your teeth after the breakfast. Obviously you cannot refrain from not turning on your laptop for a while. You just need to enter your disk encryption passphrase/PIN/whatever. Your encryption software happily displays the prompt, like if nothing happened. After all how could it possibly know the Evil Program, like BluePillBoot, has just been loaded a moment ago from the MBR or a PCI EEPROM? It can not! So, you enter the valid password, your system gets the decryption key and you can get access to your encrypted system...
  3. But then you have an appointment at the hotel SPA (at least this little fun you can have on a business trip, right?). Obviously you don't want to look so geeky and you won't take your laptop with you to the SPA, will you? The Evil Maid just waited for this occasion… She sneaks again into your room and powers up your laptop. She presses a magic key combo, which results in the Evil Program displaying the sniffed decryption password. Now, depending on their level of subtleness, she could either steal your whole laptop or only some more important data from the laptop. Your system disk encryption software is completely useless against her now.
(Yes, I know that's 3 bullets, but the Evil Maid had to sneak into your room only twice:)

So, why the BitLocker would not allow for this simple attack? Because the BitLocker software should actually be able to know that the system gets compromised (by the Evil Program) since the last boot. BitLocker should then refuse to display a password prompt. And even if it didn't and asked the user for the password, still it should not be able to get the actual decryption key out from the TPM, because the values in the certain PCR register(s) will be wrong (they will now account for the modified hashes of the MBR or PCI EEPROM or BIOS). The bottom line is: the maid is not getting the decryption key (just as the user now), which is what this is all about.

At least this is how the BitLocker should work. I shall add a disclaimer here, that neither myself, nor anybody from my team, have looked into the BitLocker implementation. We have not, because, as of yet, there have been no customers interested in this kind of BitLocker implementation evaluation. Also, I should add that Microsoft has not paid me to write this article. I simply hope this might positively stimulate other vendors, like e.g. TrueCrypt (Hi David!), or Apple, to add SRTM or, better yet, DRTM, to their system encryption products.

Of course, when we consider an idiot-attack, that involves simply garbbing somebody's laptop and running away with it (i.e. without any prior preparation like our Evil Maid did), then probably all system disk encryption software would be just good enough (assuming it doesn't have any bugs in the crypto code).

Some people might argue that using a BIOS password would be just as good as using trusted boot. After all, if we disable booting from alternate media in BIOS (e.g. from USB sticks) and lock down the BIOS using a password (i.e. using the Power-On password, not just the BIOS supervisor password), then the above two-stage attacks should not be feasible. Those people might argue, that even if the Evil Maid had cleared the CMOS memory (by removing the CMOS battery from the motherboard), still they would be able to notice that something is wrong — the BIOS would not longer be asking for the password, or the password would be different from what they used before.

That is a valid point, but relaying on the BIOS password to provide security for all your data might not be such a good idea. First problem is that all the BIOSes have had a long history of various default or "maintenance" passwords (I actually do not know how the situation looks today with those default passwords). Another problem is that the attacker might first clear the CMOS memory, and then modify her Evil MBR program to also display a fake BIOS password prompt, that would accept anything the user enters. This way the user will not be alerted that something is wrong and will be willing to provide the real password for drive decryption when prompted later by the actual drive encryption software.

One might ask why can't the attacker use the similar attack against BitLocker? Even if the real BitLocker uses trusted boot process, we can still infect the MBR, display the fake BitLocker PIN prompt and this way get into the possession of the user's PIN.

This attack, however, can be spotted by an inquisitive user — after all, if he or she knows they provided the correct PIN, then it would be suspicious not to see the system being booted (and it won't boot, because the fake BitLocker will not be able to retrieve the password from the TPM). If the fake BitLocker wanted to boot the OS (so that user didn't suspect anything), it would have to remove itself from the system and then reboot the system. Again this should alert the user that something wrong is going on.

There is also a much more elegant way of defending against the above attack (with fake BitLocker prompt) — but I'd rather let Microsoft to figure it out by themselves ;)

By the way, contrary to a popular belief the BitLocker doesn't protect your computer from boot-stage infections, e.g. MBR viruses or BIOS/PCI rootkits. As we have been pointing out since the first edition of our Understanding Stealth Malware training at Black Hat in August 2007, BitLocker should not be thought as of a system integrity protection. This is because it is trivial, for any malware that already got access to the running Vista, to re-seal the BitLocker key to arbitrary new system firmware/MBR configuration. Everybody can try it by going to Control Panel/BitLocker Driver Encryption, then clicking on the "Turn Off BitLocker" and choosing "Disable BitLocker Drive Encryption". This will simply save your disk decryption key in plaintext, allowing you to e.g. reflash your BIOS, boot Vista again and then to enable BitLocker again (this would generate a new key and seal it to the TPM with the new PCR values).


This functionality has been provided obviously to allow user to update his or her firmware. But what is important to keep in mind is that this process of disabling BitLocker doesn't involve entering any special password or PIN (e.g. the BitLocker's PIN). It just enough that you are the default user with admin rights or some malware running in this context. Pity they decided on the simplest solution here. But still BitLocker is simply the one coolest thing in Vista and something I really miss on all other OSes...


Xen 0wning Trilogy: code, demos and q35 attack details posted

We hit posted every the cipher that we used last period during our Negroid Hat presentations about Xen security, and you can intend it here. This includes the flooded source cipher for:

1) The generic Xen Loadable Modules framework

2) Implementation of the two Xen Hypervisor Rootkits

3) The Q35 exploit

4) The FLASK collection overflow exploit

5) The BluePillBoot (with nested virtualization support on SVM)

6) The XenBluePill (with nested virtualization support on SVM)

Beware the cipher is by farther not user-friendly, it requires advanced Linux/Xen, C and system-level programming skills in visit to tweak some constants and separate it successfully on your system. Do not beam us questions how to compile/run it, as we don’t hit instance to answer such questions. Also do not beam questions how the cipher works – if you can’t amount it out by reading our slides and the source code, then it means you should probably spend more instance on this yourself. On the other hand, we would appreciate some shaping feedback.

The cipher is our gift to the research community. There is no warranty and Invisible Things Lab takes no responsibility for some possibleness damage that this cipher might cause (e.g. by rebooting your machine) or some possibleness vindictive practice of this code, or some other cipher built on crowning of this code. We conceive that by publishing this cipher we help to create more bonded systems in the future.

Additionally, we also posted the flooded version of our ordinal Negroid Hat talk, which now includes every the slides about the Q35 bug and how we misused it. Those slides had to be previously removed during our Negroid Hat presentation, as the patch was ease unavailable during that time.
 
 

More Thoughts on CPU backdoors

I've recently exchanged a few emails with Loic Duflot about CPU-based backdoors. It turned out that he recently wrote a paper about hypothetical CPU-backdoors and also implemented some proof-of-concept ones using QEMU (for he doesn't happen to own a private CPU production line). The paper can be bought . (Loic is an academic, and so he must follow some of the strange customs in the academic world, one of them being that papers are not freely published, but rather being sold on a publisher website… Heck, even we, the ultimately commercialized researchers, still publish our papers and code for free).

Let me stress that what Loic writes about in the paper are only hypothetical backdoors, i.e. no actual backdoors have been found on any real CPU (ever, AFAIK!). What he does is he considers how Intel or AMD could implement a backdoor, and then he simulate this process by using QEMU and implementing those backdoors inside QEMU.

Loic also focuses on local privilege escalation backdoors only. You should however not underestimate a good local privilege escalation — such things could be used to break out of any virtual machine, like VMWare, or potentially even out of a software VMs like e.g. Java VM.

The backdoors Loic considers are somewhat similar in principle to the simple pseudo-code one-liner backdoor I used in my previous post about hardware backdoors, only more complicated in the actual implementation, as he took care about a few important details, that I naturally didn't concern. (BTW, the main message of my previous post about was how cool technology this VT-d is, being able to prevent PCI-based backdoors, and not about how doomed we are because of Intel- or AMD-induced potential backdoors).

Some people believe that processor backdoors do not exist in reality, because if they did, the competing CPU makers would be able to find them in each others' products, and later would likely cause a "leak" to the public about such backdoors (think: Black PR). Here people make an assumption that AMD or Intel is technically capable of reversing each others processors, which seems to be a natural consequence of them being able to produce them.

I don't think I fully agree with such an assumption though. Just the fact that you are capable of designing and producing a CPU, doesn't mean you can also reverse engineer it. Just the fact that Adobe can write a few hundred megabyte application, doesn't mean they are automatically capable of also reverse engineering similar applications of that size. Even if we assumed that it is technically feasible to use some electron microscope to scan and map all the electronic elements from the processor, there is still a problem of interpreting of how all those hundreds of millions of transistors actually work.

Anyway, a few more thoughts about properties of a hypothetical backdoors that Intel or AMD might use (be using).

First, I think that in such a backdoor scenario everything besides the "trigger" would be encrypted. The trigger is something that you must execute first, in order to activate the backdoor (e.g. the CMP instruction with particular, i.e. magic, values of some registers, say EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX). Only then the backdoor gets activated and e.g. the processor auto-magically escalates into Ring 0. Loic considers this in more detail in his paper. So, my point is that all the attacker's code that executes afterwards, think of it as of a shellcode for the backdoor, that is specific for the OS, is fetched by the processor in an encrypted form and decrypted only internally inside the CPU. That should be trivial to implement, while at the same time should complicate any potential forensic analysis afterwards — it would be highly non-trivial to understand what the backdoor actually have done.

Another crucial thing for a processor backdoor, I think, should be some sort of an anti-reply attack protection. Normally, if a smart admin had been recording all the network traffic, and also all the executables that ever got executed on the host, chances are that he or she would catch the triggering code and the shellcode (which might be encrypted, but still). So, no matter how subtle the trigger is, it is still quite possible that a curious admin will eventually find out that some tetris.exe somehow managed to breakout of a hardware VM and did something strange, e.g. installed a rootkit in a hypervisor (or some Java code somehow was able to send over all our DOCX files from our home directory).

Eventually the curious admin will find out that strange CPU instruction (the trigger) after which all the strange things had happened. Now, if the admin was able to take this code and replicate it, post it to Daily Dave, then, assuming his message would pass through the Moderator (Hi Dave), he would effectively compromise the processor vendor's reputation.

An anti-replay mechanism could ideally be some sort of a challenge-response protocol used in a trigger. So, instead having you always to put 0xdeadbeaf, 0xbabecafe, and 0x41414141 into EAX, EBX and EDX and execute some magic instruction (say CMP), you would have to put a magic that is a result of some crypto operation, taking current date and magic key as input:

Magic = MAGIC (Date, IntelSecretKey).

The obvious problem is how the processor can obtain current date? It would have to talk to the south-bridge at best, which is 1) nontrivial, and 2) observable on a bus, and 3) spoof'able.

A much better idea would be to equip a processor with some sort of an eeprom memory, say big enough to hold one 64-bit or maybe 128-bit value. Each processor would get a different value flashed there when leaving the factory. Now, in order to trigger the backdoor, the processor vendor (or backdoor operator, think: NSA) would have to do the following:

1) First execute some code that would read this unique value stored in eeprom for the particular target processor, and send this back to them,

2) Now, they could generate the actual magic for the trigger:

Magic = MAGIC (UniqeValueInEeprom, IntelSecretKey)

3) ...and send the actual code to execute the backdoor and shellcode, with the correct trigger embedded, based on the magic value.

Now, the point is that the processor will automatically increment the unique number stored in the eeprom, so the same backdoor-exploiting code would not work twice for the same processor (while at the same time it would be easy for NSA to send another exploit, as they know what the next value in the eeprom should be). Also, such a customized exploit would not work on any other CPU, as the assumption was that each CPU gets a different value at the factory, so again it would not be possible to replicate the attack and proved that the particular code has ever done something wrong.

So, the moment I learn that processors have built-in eeprom memory, I will start thinking seriously there are backdoors out there :)

One thing that bothers me with all those divagations about hypothetical backdoors in processors is that I find them pretty useless in at the end of the day. After all, by talking about those backdoors, and how they might be created, we do not make it any easier to protect against them, as there simply is no possible defense here. Also this doesn't make it any easier for us to build such backdoors (if we wanted to become the bad guys for a change). It might only be of an interest to Intel or AMD, or whatever else processor maker, but I somewhat feel they have already spent much more time thinking about it, and chances are they probably can only laugh at what we are saying here, seeing how unsophisticated our proposed backdoors are. So, my Dear Reader, I think you've been just wasting time reading this post ;) Sorry for tricking you into this and I hope to write something more practical next time :)

Quest to The Core

If you think SMM rootkits or PCI backdoors is low-level, then you should certainly see our talks in Vegas — ITL is going to define what does the "low-level" adjective really mean at the end of the decade ;)

In case you haven't noticed it at the Black Hat website yet — Alex and Rafal will be giving two presentations in Vegas:

1) Introducing Ring -3 Rootkits (description)

2) Attacking Intel® BIOS (description)

Let me stress that we have been in touch with Intel for quite some time about the above attacks, and that Intel is planning to release appropriate fixes a few weeks before our presentations at Black Hat.

There is more than just this coming at this year's Black Hat — most notably we will also be debuting with our Virtualization (In)Security Training. I will write a separate post about this training (containing a detailed agenda) in the coming days, so stay tuned.

Quite exciting.


Virtualization (In)Security Training in Vegas

VM escapes, hypervisor compromises (via "classic" rootkits, as well as Bluepill-like rootkits), hypervisor protection strategies, SMM attacks, TXT bypassing, and more — these are some of the topics that will be covered by our brand new training on Virtualization (In)Security at the upcoming Black Hat USA.

The training offers quite a unique chance, I think, to absorb the results of 1+ year of the research done by our team within... just 2 days. This will be provided via detailed lectures and unique hands-on exercises.

Unlike our previous training on stealth malware (that will also be offered this year, BTW), this time we will offer attendees a bit of hope :) We will be stressing that some of the new hardware technologies (Intel TXT, VT, TPM), if used properly, have potential to dramatically increase security of our computer systems. Sure, we will be showing attacks against those technologies (e.g. TXT), but nevertheless we will be stressing that this is the proper way to go in the long run.

Interestingly, I'm not aware of any similar training of this kind, that would be covering the security issues related to virtualization systems and bare metal hypervisors. Hope we will not get into troubles with the Antitrust Commission for monopolizing this field ;)

The training brochure (something for your boss) is .

The detailed agenda spanning 2 full days can be downloaded .

The Black Hat signup page is

Customize Your Website with Professional Drupal Themes

There was a time when websites were only for the big boys: the few large companies who could hire full-time web designers or outsource the work to expensive design companies. A lucky few had specialized degrees with knowledge of web programming and could design their sites by themselves.

Today it is a totally different ball game. If you aren't doing business on the web, most customers won't even know you exist, putting you light years behind your competition. The question is no longer whether you are have a website, but how much of your business is done online?

As the demand for websites increased, content management systems were designed that made the creation of functional websites much more accessible. You no longer needed a design team or a MIS degree to build a website, only creativity and ingenuity.

One of the most flexible and highly adaptable tools for designing websites is Drupal, a free, open source content management system. Open source simply means that users have practical access to source code, which has no restrictions on its use. With access to the source code, the extensive community of Drupal users have developed their own modules to further customize Drupal's core website. Modules are plugins that make Drupal more functional and extend or enhance its capabilities.

However, powerful content management systems like Drupal make professional, user-friendly websites a possibility for not just you, but your rivals as well, moving the challenge from “how do I build a website?” to “how do I make sure my website have a competitive edge?”

One way to impress is by using Drupal templates. A quick web search of "Drupal templates" will yield websites boasting hundreds of free Drupal templates to help you build your site. While these free Drupal templates may save time versus building a website from scratch or offer a good starting point for beginners, in the end they are worth what you pay for them. After all, who wants a cookie cutter design that customers have seen over and over again? You want a distinctive, expert design with an eye-catching layout that stands out from the pack.

TopNotchThemes creates original Drupal templates exclusively for Drupal-hosted websites that are fully customizable and can give your business the competitive edge you are looking for. Graphic designers and developers spend 40-60 hours on each theme, designing them especially for SEO and offering compatibility across a variety of browsers. All themes come ready to launch, but for the Drupal novice, TopNotch Themes offer a free e-book detailing how to get the most out of your Drupal template. The guide offers instruction on how to start your e-business, build your site and optimize and maintain your Drupal site. For superior quality Drupal templates for your website, contact them at www.TopNotchThemes.com.

An Overview on Microsoft ASP.NET Technology

Microsoft. ASP.NET is used to create web pages and web technologies and is an integral part of Microsoft's .NET framework vision. ASP.NET is the latest web based technology in web development and design field. It is also simple and easy to use for user and programmer to code it. .NET is providing one type of platform which supports different web application to execute and run it. ASP means active server pages it will generate HTML and dynamic web pages.

ASP.NET is not limited to script languages, it allows you to make use of .NET languages like C#, J#, VB, etc. It allows developers to build very compelling applications by making use of Visual Studio, the development tool provided by Microsoft. ASP.NET is purely server-side technology. It is built on a common language runtime that can be used on any Windows server to host powerful ASP.NET web sites and technologies.

If you are just starting out in web development, .net can be a great resource. The average website requires very little of the fancy tricks and tools that .net is great at integrating. Additionally, for advanced features, the languages are easy to use and the possibilities of what you can create are almost endless.

The drawback to this, is that if you want different looking pages, this is almost useless, and makes developing a site more difficult. Additionally, .net has a drawback in that it requires either C# or VB to write any code for the site. These languages are relatively simple to master, but pose a learning curve for people that have developed in traditional asp (VB Script) or php. The silver lining, is that .net is a compiled language which protects your code. Also, the language by default utilizes preset libraries that provide a wide range of functionality you can easily integrate into your website.

ASP.NET website development as a technology allows developers to create shopping carts that are flexible, search engine friendly and can be set up quite easily. The flexibility provided by ASP .NET framework adds more value to your online storefront. You can add unlimited products, categories and even customize the layout and design according to your convenience, many sub categories can be created within the existing categories and these applications are easy that user themselves can alter the applications according to their need. Shopping carts developed using the ASP.NET framework support database friendly languages like MS-ACCESS and MS-SQL.

Microsoft Excel 2003: Working With all Toolbars

Toolbars are a crucial part of the Microsoft Excel 2003 Application and assist in improving your productivity and efficiency in the application. Microsoft Excel contains a range of toolbars that you can use for a variety of different tasks. The toolbar is simply a small bar that contains a variety of buttons that contain a graphic image called an Icon. Each button represents one single command on the toolbar. To utilise a button all you need to do is to position your mouse pointer over the button and click once with your left mouse button.

The Microsoft Excel application shows by default two key toolbars and they are the Standard Toolbar and the Formatting Toolbar. These are the most common toolbars that you will utilise in Microsoft Excel and contain key commands. After your initial installation of the Microsoft Excel application you will find that these two toolbars are in fact located on the one line. However you can change their position and reposition the toolbars on the screen.

To move a toolbar, position your mouse pointer over the little blue four dotted bar at the start of the toolbar. Hold your left mouse button down and then drag. Using this technique, you can drag the toolbar either down from its current position under the Menu bar or you can drag it to the left or right.

When you resize the toolbar to the left or right, you will notice that some of the icons from either toolbar will appear and disappear. This is by design. Essentially the application adjusts the size of the toolbar and changes the icons based on those that fit on the resized toolbar.

Another fantastic tool included with the toolbar is the ability to identify what the toolbar button does just by holding your mouse over the icon. When you do this, a Tool Tip appears just like the one shown here - .

Microsoft provides an option in the Customize dialogue box, which is found under the Tools menu to show both the Standard toolbar and the Formatting toolbar by default. However to have the toolbars on one row you must deselect the Show Standard and Formatting toolbars on two rows command.

If you want the two Standard and Formatting toolbars on two rows you select the check box of the command Show Standard and Formatting toolbars on two rows command.

There are a variety of toolbars in the Microsoft Excel application and to display (or hide) those toolbars you must first go to the View menu and then choose Toolbars. When you view the menu there is some important information you must be aware of.

If there is a tick next to one of the toolbar names then this indicates that the toolbar is already visible. Alternatively, no tick indicates that the toolbar is hidden.

To turn a toolbar on, click once with your left mouse button on the toolbar name. If you want to turn the toolbar off, click on the toolbar name once again.

You will find that most toolbars will be located toward the top of the screen however you can reposition the toolbar anywhere on the screen.

Toolbars are known to be in two modes – Docked Mode and Floating Mode. When a toolbar is in Floating Mode you can reposition it on the screen by moving your mouse pointer into the Title bar, holding your left mouse button down and dragging it to where you would like it to go.

If you would like to quickly dock your floating toolbar back to where it was originally docked, just Double Click on the Toolbars Title bar.

Sumit1
 
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